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UKWeestimate the impact of a carbon tax onmanufacturing plants using panel data from theUKproduction census.
Our identiﬁcation strategy builds on the comparison of outcomes between plants subject to the full tax and plants
that paid only 20% of the tax. Exploiting exogenous variation in eligibility for the tax discount, we ﬁnd that the
carbon tax had a strong negative impact on energy intensity and electricity use. No statistically signiﬁcant im-
pacts are found for employment, revenue or plant exit.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The rise of climate policy on government agendas around the world
has stirred a renewed interest in the optimal design of large-scale regu-
lation of environmental externalities. Climate change – the “ultimate
commons problem” (Stavins, 2011) – is caused by anthropogenic emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (GHG) such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and is
expected to have severe ecological and economic consequences (IPCC,
2007). Mitigating climate change will require substantial abatement of
GHG emissions from all core economic sectors (Pacala and Socolow,
2004). The choice of appropriate policy instruments for each of these
sectors is essential for minimizing the overall economic costs of mitiga-
tion with given technologies (static efﬁciency), and for stimulating
technological innovations that will further reduce mitigation costs in
the future (dynamic efﬁciency). This paper evaluates the performancechool, Imperial College London,
dom. Tel.: +44 20 7594 2615.
, uwagner@eco.uc3m.es
. This is an open access article underof one such instrument, a tax designed to curb industrial CO2 emissions,
in a panel of manufacturing plants.
Manufacturing is a major contributor to GHG emissions around the
world.1 Since most manufactured goods are tradable, there is a risk
that regulated ﬁrms will lose international competitiveness, shed part
of their labor force or even exit. These concerns have been fueling vehe-
ment opposition towards regulation and left their mark on the design of
the policies implemented so far. Command-and-control policies have
long been the predominant form of environmental regulation in the
manufacturing sector, and their impacts have been studied extensively
in the context of air pollution.2 On theoretical grounds, economists have
favored market-based instruments such as taxes and tradable permit
schemes because they are more efﬁcient in both the static and dynamic
senses (e.g. Montgomery, 1972; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Tietenberg,1 Together with primary industry, the manufacturing sector accounts for almost 40% of
GHG emissionsworldwide (IEA, 2010). Total carbon emissions from the business sector in
2000 were estimated at 60.3 MtC (NAO, 2007).
2 The literature has examined the effects of air quality regulation on air pollution
(Henderson, 1996; Greenstone, 2004), industrial activity (Becker and Henderson, 2000;
Greenstone, 2002), plant births and deaths (Henderson, 1996; Levinson, 1996; List et al.,
2003), plant-level productivity (Berman and Bui, 2001; Gray and Shadbegian, 2003), for-
eign direct investment (Hanna, 2010) and market structure (Ryan, 2012).
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
5 A study commissioned by the UK government estimates the annual tax revenue lost
due to the tax discount at £366 million or 44% of the actual CCL revenue in 2003 (Cam-
bridge Econometrics, 2005).
6 With the passing into law of the Climate Change Bill in November 2008, the commit-
ment to reduce GHG emissions in the UK by at least 80% until 2050 has become legally
binding.
7 For example, the revised UK Climate Change Programme (HM Government, 2006)
designated the CCL package as the top contributor of carbon savings (6.6 MtC towards
an overall reduction goal of 20.8 MtC by 2010). As we explain in Section 2.3 below, such
projections are highly sensitive to the assumed trajectory of baseline emissions.
2 R. Martin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 117 (2014) 1–141990). However, empirical evidence on the impacts of market-based
environmental regulation on manufacturing is scarce, especially when
it comes to carbon emissions.3 For example, the European Union Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the largest cap-and-trade system for
carbon emissions worldwide, is overdue for a microeconometric evalu-
ation (Martin et al., 2013b).While carbon taxes have been implemented
in various EU countries, their rigorous evaluation has proven difﬁcult, be
it because of the lack of suitable microdata or because of the lack of a
compelling identiﬁcation strategy.4
This paper ﬁlls the void by analyzing the Climate Change Levy (CCL)
package— the single most important climate change policy that the UK
government has unilaterally imposed on the business sector so far (HM
Government, 2006). The package consists of a carbon tax – the CCL –
and a schemeof voluntary agreements available to plants in selected en-
ergy intensive industries. Upon joining a Climate Change Agreement
(CCA), a plant adopts a speciﬁc target for energy consumption or carbon
emissions in exchange for a highly discounted tax liability under the
CCL. While the CCL package is still in place today, our analysis focuses
on the ﬁrst three years following its introduction in 2001, thereby
avoiding overlap with the EU ETS. During the period of analysis, the
CCL added 15% to the energy bill of a typical UK business (NAO, 2007)
and the discount granted under a CCA amounted to 80% of the tax rate.
Given its scope and institutional context, the CCL package provides a
unique opportunity to study the effects of a carbon tax in an industrial-
ized economy. We use longitudinal data on manufacturing plants to es-
timate the impact of the CCL on energy use, emissions and economic
performance. Our identiﬁcation strategy is to compare changes in
outcomes between fully-taxed CCL plants and CCA plants. A naïve
difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator would likely be biased
because the plants that were eligible for CCA participation could self-
select their tax regime. However, plants were only eligible if they emit-
ted pollutants subject to environmental regulation pre-dating the CCL.
The variation in eligibility across plants can hence be exploited to instru-
ment for the tax rate.We implement this idea in an IV frameworkwhere
the reduced form is a DiD regression of plant outcomes on eligibility. For
this approach to be consistent, it must be true that differences between
eligible and non-eligible plants are not systematically related to changes
in outcome variables over the treatment period. While this assumption
is not testable, we show that there are no signiﬁcant trend differences
between eligible and non-eligible ﬁrms in the pre-treatment period. In
addition, we exploit the panel structure of the dataset to control for
pre-trends directly in the regression.
Firms in the control group were not only entitled to a tax discount,
but they also faced a reduction target for energy consumption or carbon
emissions. Although these targets could have placed binding constraints
on the plant's production choices, the fact thatmassive over compliance
occurred right from the start suggests otherwise. In fact, a large degree
of ﬂexibility was built into both the target negotiation process and the
compliance review. If targets were nonetheless stringent, then our esti-
mate represents a lower bound on the full price effect of the tax differ-
ential between the two groups of plants.
With this approach, we ﬁnd robust evidence that the CCL had a
strong negative impact on energy intensity, particularly at larger and
more energy intensive plants. An analysis of fuel choices at the plant
level reveals that this effect is mainly driven by a reduction in electricity
use and translates into a negative impact on CO2 emissions. In contrast,
we do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant impacts of the tax on employ-
ment, revenue (gross output) or total factor productivity (TFP). In addi-
tion, we examine extensive-margin adjustments and ﬁnd no evidence3 One reason for this is that most existing cap-and-trade programs regulate emissions
from electric generators only – such as themuch-studied SO2 trading implemented under
theUSAcid Rain Program (see e.g. Ellermanet al., 2000) – anddonot covermanufacturing
emissions in signiﬁcant ways. The RECLAIM program for NOX emissions in California is an
exception (Fowlie et al., 2012).
4 See Bjorner and Jensen (2002) for an early microeconometric evaluation of industrial
energy taxes in Denmark.that the CCL accelerated plant exit. While the regression-based test we
use does not have much power to detect small negative impacts on
these outcomes, our results do not substantiate worries about devastat-
ing effects of the CCL on the competitiveness of UK manufacturing,
which gave way to a costly exemption scheme.5
Over the past two decades, carbon taxes and their effects on indus-
trial competitiveness have been a matter of political debate in many in-
dustrialized countries. By conducting the ﬁrst ex-post analysis of the
causal impact of such a tax on manufacturing, our study provides
much-needed empirical evidence on the impacts of large-scale regula-
tion aimed at pricing pollution. It does so in the context of climate
change – an area where regulatory stringency is bound to increase in
the near future – and with a focus on manufacturing, the principal en-
gine of growth in the emerging economies and still a cornerstone of em-
ployment in post-industrial economies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the CCL package in detail and reviews previous research on the
tax. Section 3 describes the research design and econometric framework.
Section 4 describes the data sources and summarizes the dataset used for
the analysis. Section 5 reports the main results and presents several ro-
bustness checks. Section 6 examines heterogeneous impacts, aggregate
effects and estimates the impact of the CCL on exit. Section 7 concludes.2. Background
2.1. The Climate Change Levy and Climate Change Agreements
Since the 1990s the UK has adopted a series of increasingly ambi-
tious targets for climate policy. In addition to a 12.5% reduction of
GHG emissions from 1990 levels to be achieved under the Kyoto Proto-
col, the Blair administration promised to reduce CO2 emissions by 19%
by 2010 and by 60% by 2050.6When the CCL packagewas implemented
in 2001, it constituted the single-most important policy aimed at
achieving these goals.7
The CCL is a per unit tax payable at the time of supply to industrial
and commercial users of energy. It was ﬁrst announced in March 1999
and came into effect in April 2001. Taxed fuels include coal, electricity,
natural gas, and non-transport liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG). For each
fuel type subject to the CCL, Table 1 displays the tax rates per kilowatt
hour (kWh) equivalent, the average energy price in Pound Sterling
paid by manufacturing plants in 2001 and the implicit carbon tax. Ener-
gy tax rates vary substantially across fuel types, ranging from 6.1% on
coal to 16.5% on natural gas.8
While the tax establishes a meaningful price incentive for energy
conservation overall, it is immediately seen that carbon contained in
gas and electricity is taxed at almost twice the rate as carbon contained
in coal.9 Other fuel types were tax-exempt precisely because of their
low carbon content, such as electricity generated from renewable
sources and from combined heat and power. Hence, rather than a8 Tax rates were constant from 2001 until 2006 and adjusted for inﬂation only in April
2007.
9 David Pearce attributed this perverse effect to historical ties between the governing
Labour Party and the coal industry, which had suffered from the “dash for gas” over the
1990s and successfully lobbied for a lower tax rate on coal. Mineral oil was exempt from
the tax because itwas already covered by the rather unpopular ‘Fuel Duty Escalator’, a pol-
icy of automatic increases in the taxes on diesel and gasoline. Residential energy use was
not taxed for fear of a possible regressive effect (Pearce, 2006).
11 Most of this (2.6 MtC) was due to a dramatic decline in steel production. But even
Table 1
Taxation of energy and carbon content by fuel type.






[Percent] PoundsTon of carbon
 
Electricity 0.43 4.25 10.1 31
Coal 0.15 2.46 6.1 16
Natural gas 0.15 0.91 16.5 30
LPG 0.07 0.85 8.2 22
Notes: Fuel prices and taxes are measured in Pence per kilowatt hour (kWh) equivalent.
Average fuel prices in 2001 are based on the QFI sample (see Section 4 for details). Carbon
prices taken from Pearce (2006).
3R. Martin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 117 (2014) 1–14pure carbon tax the CCL is a tax on energy with non-uniform rates,
shaped by a mixed bag of ﬁscal and regulatory goals.
Similar to other European governments that had introduced energy
taxes during the 1990s, the UK government set up a scheme of negoti-
ated agreements, the CCAs, in order to mitigate possible adverse effects
of the CCL on the competitiveness of energy intensive industries. By
participating in a CCA, facilities in certain energy intensive sectors can
reduce their tax liability by 80% provided that they adopt a binding tar-
get on their energy use or carbon emissions.
Deﬁned either in absolute terms or relative to output, these targets
were negotiated at two levels. In an ‘umbrella agreement’, the sector as-
sociation and the government – represented at the time by the Depart-
ment for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) – agreed upon a
sector-wide target for energy use or carbon emissions in 2010 and on
interim targets for each two-year compliance period. At a lower level,
‘underlying agreements’ stipulate a speciﬁc reduction to be achieved
by a ‘target unit’, i.e. a facility or group of facilities in a sector with an
umbrella agreement. DEFRA originally negotiated 44 umbrella agree-
ments with different industrial sectors, including the ten most energy
intensive ones.10
While the primary objective of both the CCL and the CCAs is to en-
hance the efﬁciency of energy use in the business sector, the two instru-
ments represent fundamentally different approaches. The levy provides
a price signal at roughly 15% of energy prices faced by the typical busi-
ness in 2001 (NAO, 2007). If energy demand is price sensitive, the in-
creased relative price of energy should lead to a reduction in energy
consumption. In terms of CO2 emissions, this effect could be offset in
part by a shift towards more carbon-intensive fuels.
In contrast, the CCA combines a very diluted price signal of
0.2 × 15% = 3% of energy prices faced by the typical business with
quantity regulation, mostly in the form of efﬁciency targets. This target
affects the plant only if it places a binding constraint on the trajectory of
energy use during the remaining economic lifetime of the plant. If this is
not the case, the plant faces weaker incentives for energy conservation
than it would under the full tax rate. Moreover, since most targets are
speciﬁed in terms of energy units rather than carbon emissions, there
is no guarantee that even a stringent energy target leads to emission
reductions.without steel and three other sectors that adopted absolute targets there was substantial
overcompliance,with estimated carbon savings of 3MtC (3.9MtC and4.3MtC, respective-
ly, in subsequent compliance periods; see NAO, 2007).
12 The allowance price ﬂuctuated between £7 and £15 per ton of carbon (£2 and £4 per
ton of CO2 equivalent) for most of the period (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). This price
was conditioned primarily by marginal abatement costs of 32 ‘direct participants’ in the
UK ETS who had bid emission reductions in exchange for government incentives. Trading
activity in the UK ETS increased in March 2003 and March 2005 when some CCA ﬁrms
bought allowances to meet their interim targets, yet this demand was not strong enough
to put upward pressure on the permit price.
13 In addition, performance in some sectors was measured against a ‘tolerance band’ in
lieu of a ﬁxed target. In some instances, fast growing companies that belonged to a sector
with an absolute target successfully bargained for a relative target (and vice versa) as this
made it easier to achieve compliance (NAO, 2007).
14 There is, however, a sizable number of plants that are not signing up for a CCA despite
being eligible. This is likely due to costs of joining a CCA other than those associated with
meeting speciﬁc energy consumption targets. For example, CCA participants need to com-
ply with more elaborate monitoring requirements and pay their sector association for the2.2. How stringent are the targets negotiated in the CCAs?
In theory, an omniscient government can choose a combination of tax
discount and reduction targets so as to induce at least as much abate-
ment as under the full tax rate (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). In reality,
however, the government is unlikely to have perfect information about
ﬁrm-speciﬁc abatement cost, especially if ﬁrms worry that sharing this
information with the government weakens their bargaining position in
the target negotiations. What is more, the government might not have
beenwilling to drive a hard bargain for fear of jeopardizing international
competitiveness and exacerbating distortions in marginal abatement
cost (de Muizon and Glachant, 2003; Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). A10 See online Appendix A for more details.closer inspection of the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of
CCA targets yields a number of reasons to believe that the targets did
not place binding constraints on ﬁrm behavior.
First, the government may have “double counted” carbon savings
from the CCA scheme (ACE, 2005). On average, CCA targets were sup-
posed to improve energy efﬁciency by 11% between 2000 and 2010.
This ﬁgure is well above the 4.8% improvement the government expect-
ed to occur under a “business as usual” (BAU) scenario (AEAT, 2001).
However, alternative BAU scenariosweremuch closer to the CCA target,
projecting energy efﬁciency of all UK industry to improve by 9.5% (DG
Transport and Energy, 1999) or even 11.5% when taking into account
the effect of the CCL (DTI, 2000).
Second, there was massive overcompliance with CCA targets. Com-
bined annual carbon savings in all CCA sectors were substantially larger
than the 2010 target throughout the ﬁrst three compliance periods. At
the end of theﬁrst compliance period in 2002, CCA sectors reported sav-
ings of 4.5 MtC — almost twice the target amount of 2.5 MtC to be
achieved by 2010.11 Consistent with this, the proportion of compliant
target units was high, rising from 88% in the ﬁrst compliance period to
98% and 99% in the second and third compliance periods, respectively
(AEAT, 2004, 2005, 2007). CCA participants that did not meet their tar-
get could attain compliance by buying emission allowances on the UK
Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS), a carbon market that was opera-
tional between 2002 and 2006. Allowance prices in this market
remained below the implicit carbon tax rates given in Table 1.12
Third, the lower bound on compliance cost is zero. This is because fa-
cilities were re-certiﬁed for the reduced tax rate even if they hadmissed
their target, provided that the sector as a whole met its target. In 2004,
this was true of approximately 250 non-compliant target units (NAO,
2007).
Finally, a large degree of ﬂexibility in both the target negotiations
and the compliance review further limited the stringency of CCA targets.
For instance, CCA sectors could choose their own baseline year for the
target indicator. More than two thirds of all sectors chose a baseline
year prior to 2000 (in some cases going as far back as 1990), allowing
them to count carbon savings unrelated to the CCA towards target
achievement (NAO, 2007). Furthermore, targets could be adjusted ex
post to reﬂect a more energy intensive product mix, declining output,
or other ‘relevant constraints’.13 Because of this, and for the reasons
given above, it appears unlikely that the negotiated CCA targets placed
binding constraints on energy use by the average CCA company.142.3. Previous evaluations of the CCL package
Several evaluations of the CCL package were conducted at different
stages of its implementation. In the 2000 Regulatory Impact Assess-
ment, the government projected that the CCL instrument alone wouldcost of negotiating the agreements. Appendix B has a more elaborate discussion of this
along with a detailed analysis of CCA take-up.
16 The stringency of CCA targets – though relevant for the interpretation of the estimated
effect as a lower bound on the full tax effect – does not affect the consistency of the esti-
mation procedure. For example, if the targets were more stringent than the full-rate tax
then ourmethodwould lead to a negative coefﬁcient on CCA participation. Thiswould still
be a lower bound on the tax effect, albeit not a meaningful one.
17 In personal communications, representatives of CCA sector associations pointed out
multiple sources of ﬁxed costs to us. The main cost drivers are payments to consultants
or staff for doing the necessary energy accounting and administrative work as well as ad-
ministrative fees charged by the sector associations.
4 R. Martin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 117 (2014) 1–14achieve carbon savings of at least 2MtC in 2010 against BAU projections
(HMCE, 2000). This estimate was based on a model of business energy
use maintained by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). An
interim evaluation study, commissioned byDEFRA at the end of the sec-
ond commitment period in 2004, ﬁnds evidence that the announce-
ment of the CCL package in March 1999 reduced energy demand in
the service and public sectors, but not in manufacturing (Cambridge
Econometrics, 2005). The authors of the study identify this “announce-
ment effect” as a structural break in an error correction model of quar-
terly energy demand (see Agnolucci et al., 2004, for more details). A
series of simulation studies uses a macroeconometric model of the UK
economy to assess the CCL package. An important result is “that the en-
ergy (and therefore carbon) saving and energy-efﬁciency targets would
have beenmetwithout theCCAs” (Cambridge Econometrics, 2005, p. 7),
which conﬁrms the conclusion drawn above on the lack of target strin-
gency. Since model simulations of the CCL package give rise to much
smaller carbon savings than ofﬁcial estimates computed for the ﬁrst
compliance period (AEAT, 2004), Ekins and Etheridge (2006, p. 2079)
conclude that “the CCL package as implemented […] achieved a greater
carbon reduction than a no-rebate CCL would have done by itself”. They
attribute this to managers becoming aware of more cost-effective efﬁ-
ciency enhancement projects as they started to benchmark their energy
use. To be sure, the existence of such an “awareness effect” depends on
whether the ofﬁcial carbon savings were real and not just a conse-
quence of AEAT's (2001) pessimistic BAU scenario. In another simula-
tion study on the impact of the CCAs on output and employment, a
large effect of the CCAs on sectoral energy demand – averaging a 9.1%
reduction in sectoral energy use by 2010 – is built into themodel rather
than estimated (Barker et al., 2007).
These assessments of the CCL package highlight two fundamental
challenges in policy evaluation, namely (i) to determine a valid baseline
against which tomeasure the impact of a policy and (ii) to attribute any
measured impact to this policy in a causal fashion. In studies that use
simulated trajectories of energy use as a baseline against which to mea-
sure the impact of the CCL package, the validity of the results critically
depends on the counterfactual baseline being true. In econometric stud-
ies based on time series data at the sector level, it is difﬁcult to discern
the effects of the policy from that of unobserved aggregate shocks.15
The present study is the ﬁrst evaluation of the Climate Change Levy
package to use longitudinal business microdata. We address the base-
line problem by comparing changes in actual ﬁrm behavior under two
types of policy regimes, thus purging the effect of aggregate shocks.
Moreover, we identify the causal effect of the tax by exploiting exoge-
nous variation in the eligibility rules for the tax rebate. The next section
explains our research design in detail.
3. Research design
3.1. Econometric model
We seek to estimate the effect of the CCL by comparing plants that
pay the full tax rate with plants that pay just 20% of the tax by virtue
of being in a CCA. We consider the estimation equation
yit ¼ αTit þ x0itβ þ ξt þ ηi þ ϵit ð1Þ
where yit is an outcome variable (for expositional purposes, think of en-
ergy use), Tit is the treatment dummy indicating that a plant pays the
full rate of the tax, xit is a vector of strictly exogenous covariates (includ-
ing a constant), ξt and ηi are unobserved year and plant effects, respec-
tively, and ϵit is a random disturbance term. Three fundamental issues
need to be addressed. First, while the CCA plants in the control group15 When the CCL package was introduced, energy markets in the UK had been undergo-
ing important changes that entailed signiﬁcant and prolonged adjustments to prices, no-
tably declining electricity prices and increasing prices of gas and coal.receive a tax discount they are also subject to an energy consumption
or efﬁciency target which might affect their choices. Second, participa-
tion in a CCA is voluntary but not every plant is eligible. This creates a
selection endogeneity in the control group. Finally, the tax might have
heterogeneous impacts among the group of treated plants.
Estimation of Eq. (1) recovers the full effect of the CCL if – as previous
researchhas suggested –CCA targets did not impose binding constraints
onﬁrmbehavior. If the converse is true, the estimatedα falls short of the
true price effect as control plants choose lower-than-optimal levels of
energy so as to comply with their CCA target. Hence, the estimated pa-
rameter α can be regarded as a conservative estimate of the impact of
the CCL. Fig. G.1 in the online appendix illustrates this point.16
In order to estimate α consistently, one needs to address the issue of
non-random selection of plants into the control group. As we document
in Section 4.2 below, CCA plants are, on average, older, larger and more
energy intensive than CCL plants. Clearly, plants using large amounts of
energy receive a larger absolute discount on their CCL liability which
gives them a stronger incentive to join a CCA. In turn, as there are
ﬁxed costs of participating in a CCA, plants with low levels of energy
use may ﬁnd it more proﬁtable not to join.17 This is illustrated in
Fig. G.2a of the online appendix. In principle, selection effects can be ad-
dressed by adding further control variables, but selection might in part
be driven by factors not directly observable to us. For instance, given
two plants that initially use the same amount of energy, the plant
with the steeper marginal abatement cost schedule has a stronger in-
centive to join the CCA (cf. Fig. G.2b in the online appendix for an
illustration).
Thanks to having panel data we can control for selection based on
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity ηi across plants by taking
ﬁrst differences of Eq. (1).18 This yields
Δyit ¼ αΔTit þ Δx0itβ þ Δξt þ Δϵit : ð2Þ
Least-squares estimation of Eq. (2) provides an unbiased estimate of the
treatment effect α if Δϵit – the short-term deviation from a plant's idio-
syncratic trend in energy consumption – is exogenous to the decision to
join a CCA. This is not true if plants take into account their future energy
consumption when deciding on CCA participation. Plants expecting to
expand their energy consumption may perceive the CCA target as a
binding constraint and therefore rather not join a CCA, whereas plants
that expect a reduction in consumption will take the opportunity to re-
duce their tax liability provided that the cost of joining the CCA is not too
large. As a result, plants might select themselves into treatment and
control groups based on time-varying unobserved shocks to the out-
come variable, causing bias in the estimate of α.
To address this issue, we adopt an instrumental variable approach
based on eligibility rules for CCA participation. Econometrically, we per-
form a two-stage least squares estimation of Eq. (2) using the eligibility
indicator ΔZit as an instrumental variable for ΔTit. We also consider a
reduced-form or “intent-to-treat” regression of the outcome on the in-
strument variable
Δyit ¼ eαΔZit þ Δx0iteβ þ eξt þ Δeϵit: ð3Þ18 In our data we face the practical issue that some smaller plants are not sampled con-
secutively. In order not to throw away information on those plants we deﬁne the depen-
dent variable in Eq. (2) as Δyit = yit − yit − 1 for t ≤ 2000 and Δyit ≡ yit − yi2000 for
t N 2000 and transform the RHS accordingly. See Appendix C for details.
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Eligibility for CCA participation was granted to plants engaged in
polluting activities regulated under the PPC act (listed in Appendix
B.1). An eligible plant is comprised of at least one installation dedicated
to the PPC activity, such as a blast furnace or cement kiln. The
discounted rate of the CCL applies to all energy use at this installation.19
We deﬁne the instrumental variable Zi as an indicator variable that
equals 0 for all plants containing at least one eligible installation, and
1 otherwise. The instrument is relevant because the eligibility of a
plant for CCA participation ought to be correlated with its tax regime.
Furthermore, the validity of using ΔZ as an instrument for ΔT in
Eq. (2) rests on the identifying assumption that eligibility is orthogonal
to shocksΔϵit that occurred after 2000. This assumption deserves a care-
ful assessment. For instance, one might worry that plants could self-
select into PCC activities in order to become eligible for the CCA. Since
the entire CCL package was conceived and implemented in a mere
two years, and eligibility rules were established only a year before im-
plementation (in the 2000 Financial Act) it appears unlikely that ﬁrms
switched technologies in the short run just because of the CCA discount.
Moreover, if PPC regulated and non-regulated plants are subject to
different trends in the outcome variables, the resulting IV estimates
will be biased. In the empirical analysis to follow, we investigate this
possibility by looking at pre-treatment trends but ﬁnd no evidence of
such differences. A visual examination of time series plots of various
outcome variables (shown in Fig. 1 below) suggests no systematic dif-
ferences in trends between eligible and non-eligible ﬁrms before
2001. The corresponding statistical test results are reported in panel B
of Table 2 and fail to reject the hypothesis of common trends. Further-
more, our panel dataset allows us to directly control for differential
trends in the outcome regressions. As we discuss in Section 5.3 below,
this does not lead us to reject the hypothesis that outcomes in PPC
ﬁrms and non-PPC ﬁrms followed a common trend before the introduc-
tion of the CCL. Also, the point estimates of the tax effect hardly change
when controlling for pre-trends.
Finally, the exclusion restriction also rules out the possibility that
mandatory public disclosure of PPC pollution in the European Pollution
Emissions Register (EPER) had a direct effect on the outcome variables.
While this assumption is untestable, we are not aware of any evidence
that EPER reporting requirements affected ﬁrm behavior in the UK.20
Moreover, the fact that pollution emissions in 2001 were published
only in 2004 rules out any direct effects operating through the demand
side.
It is worth noting that the exclusive focus on pollution intensity
when eligibility was ﬁrst determined left many energy intensive indus-
tries ineligible for the tax discount. For instance, textile wet processing
was an eligible activity thanks to its high pollution emissions, but not
so dry processing which, although energy intensive, emits no pollution
regulated under PPC. Similarly, both the production and the recycling of
glass containers are very energy intensive processes. However, since
only the former is pollution intensive, glass container recycling was
not eligible for CCA participation.21 This institutional ‘glitch’ induces ex-
ogenous variation in the probability of treatment even within narrowly
deﬁned, energy intensive industrial sectors.19 In addition, energy use at non-eligible installations on the same site is also taxed at the
lower rate, up to a maximum of one ninth of the primary energy use at the eligible instal-
lation. Hence, it was not possible to dodge the tax by adding an installation with the sole
objective to make the entire plant eligible for the discount.
20 In the context of theUS Toxic Pollution Inventory, studies have found no signiﬁcant ef-
fects of public disclosure rules alone on pollution abatement, stock market returns or
housing prices (Bui and Mayer, 2003; Bui, 2005).
21 Other examples include tire production vs. recycling (retreading), mining and pro-
cessing of minerals using mechanical and thermal energy, and heat-treating of metals. El-
igibility rules for CCA participation were amended to include such low-pollution, energy
intensive processes, but the ﬁrst amendment occurred only after the end of our study pe-
riod, in 2006.3.3. Heterogeneity of the treatment effect
So far the treatment effect αwas implicitly assumed to be homoge-
neous across plants. For the case of heterogeneous responses to treat-
ment, Imbens and Angrist (1994) have shown that, under certain
conditions, the IV estimator identiﬁes the average treatment effect on
“compliers”, i.e. on the subset of the treated for which a change in the
instrument induces a change in treatment status. Although “compliers”
need not be representative of all treated plants, an instrument based on
a strict eligibility rule identiﬁes the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT), simply because non-eligible plants cannot receive treat-
ment (there are no “always-takers”). This result was ﬁrst derived by
Bloom (1984) and can be applied to our setting with only minor modi-
ﬁcations to the interpretation.
Recall that the treatment we consider is to pay the full tax rate, and
that the instrumental variable indicateswhether or not a plant is eligible
for an exemption from treatment. All ineligible plants must pay the full
tax rate, so that only eligible plants are able to escape the treatment (i.e.
there are no “never takers”). In Section D of the online appendix, we
show that the IV estimator identiﬁes the average treatment effect on
the non-treated plants (the ATNT), i.e. those that apply for a tax dis-
count when given the opportunity. We shall refer to this sub-
population in a more intuitive way as the group of “tax concerned”
plants.
As we explain in more detail below, we measure eligibility using
data from the EPER database. These data cover all facilities with PPC
emissions above certain reporting thresholds, whereas eligibility for a
tax discount was granted regardless of the amount of emissions. In Ap-
pendix Dwe show that this has no effect on the interpretation of our es-
timates as long as ﬁrms below and above the reporting threshold do not
differ systematically with respect to their treatment response and their
probability of being tax concerned.4. Data
The compilation of a dataset suitable for the micro-econometric
evaluation of the CCL required a major effort in terms of data collection,
cleaning andmatching. The result is a unique dataset that matches pub-
licly available information on CCA participation and EPER coverage to
production data from two conﬁdential business datasets.4.1. Data sources
The core dataset is theAnnual Respondents Database (ARD)which is
maintained by the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) and can be
accessed by approved researchers through the UK Data Service's secure
access program.22 The ARD is an annual production survey that covers
about 10,000 plants in the manufacturing sector.23 During the sample
period, all plants with 250 employees or more (in some industries:
100 or more) had to report annually whereas smaller plants were in-
cluded on a random basis (Barnes andMartin, 2002). The ARD provides
information on the plant's age, number of employees, gross output (rev-
enue), variable cost, capital stock, materials, and energy expenditures
(inclusive of CCL payments).22 Ofﬁce for National Statistics, Annual Respondents Database, 1973–2009: Secure Ac-
cess [computer ﬁle]. 3rd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], June
2012. SN: 6644.
23 Here and in the remainder of the paper a “plant” corresponds to anARD reporting unit.
This is the lowest aggregation level for which production data is available. In 70% of all
cases a reporting unit is indeed a business unit at a single mailing address — a ‘local unit’.
Larger business units are allowed to report on several local units combined so as to reduce
compliance costs. The information linking local units to reporting units is obtained from
the Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR), which in addition provides information
on plant births and deaths as well as on employment, location and industry. For more de-
tails see Criscuolo et al. (2003).
25 The craft baking sector and themeat processing sector do not contain a list of facilities.
Another ﬁve sectors lack facility addresses, namely the NFU poultry meat production sec-
(a) Energy expenditures (b) Electricity
(c) Energy share in gross output (d) Employment
Fig. 1. Trends in outcome variables by treatment status. Notes: The graphs show the average change relative to the year 2000 (yit− yi2000) for selected outcome variables yit separately for
treated (CCL) and non-treated (CCA) plants and for eligible (EPER) and non-eligible (NEPER) plants. The vertical line indicates the beginning of the treatment in April 2001. The outcome
variables are (clockwise): energy expenditures, electricity use, employment and the energy expenditure share in gross output.
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Inquiry (QFI), a quarterly survey among a panel of about 1000
manufacturing plants managed by the ONS on behalf of DTI. The survey
collects data on expenditures and quantities for all relevant fuel types,
including medium fuel oil, heavy fuel oil, gas oil, liqueﬁed petroleum
gas (LPG), coal (graded, smalls), hard coke, natural gas, and electricity.
We have data for the period from 1993 to 2004. The majority (83%) of
the observations in theQFI can bematched to theARDwithout difﬁculty
because both surveys use the same underlying government business
register IDBR as their sampling frame. However, due to random sam-
pling in the ARD we do not have ARD data for all QFI plants.24
We gathered information on CCA participation from both the DEFRA
andHMRevenue and Customs (HMRC)websites. Lists of facilities in the
original sector agreements were downloaded from DEFRA's website.
The agreements stipulate the certiﬁcation periods and the sector targets
alongwith the details on the calculation of the units of energy used and
carbon emissions. They also contain a list of all facilities initially covered
by the CCAs. Seven agreements lack sufﬁcient information on the facil-
ities covered by the CCA and thus had to be excluded from the24 For more details on the QFI and its combination with ARD data see Martin (2006).analysis.25 The HMRCwebsite provides, sector by sector, the list of facil-
ities that have joined the CCA along with the date of publication.26 The
lists are regularly updated and facilities that have resigned from the
CCA are removed. We merged the DEFRA and HMRC lists to obtain a
complete list of facilities that pay the reduced rate of the CCL. We
match this information to the ARD and QFI by combining information
on a plant's postcode and the UK Company Register Number (CRN).
To construct the instrumental variable, we downloaded publicly
available data from the European Pollution Emissions Register (EPER)
which covers all European facilities regulated under the IPPC directive
whose emissions exceed the reporting thresholds. The 2001 EPER ﬁle
contains reporting thresholds and pollution discharges into air and
water for 50 pollutants and covers 2397 facilities in 56 sectors of activity
in the UK. We construct the instrumental variable NEPER as a dummy
variable that equals one if a facility is not on the EPER list, i.e. it does
not report emissions of any of the pollutants regulated under PPCtor, the pig farming sector, the egg production sector, the British Poultry Meat Federation
farms sector, and the British poultry meat federation processing sector.
26 The date of publication is the date from which the CCA is applicable.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics in 2000 by tax regime and eligibility.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Plants subject to a 3% tax
(CCL = 0)
Plants subject to a 15% tax
(CCL = 1)
Diff. Plants eligible for a 3% tax
(NEPER = 0)




Energy share in gross output −3.881 −4.386 *** −3.731 −4.340 ***
ln(EE/GO) 696 3841 238 4299
Energy expenditure 6.457 4.655 *** 7.184 4.807 ***
ln(EE) 696 3841 238 4299
Electricity 16.311 15.068 *** 17.516 15.193 ***
ln(El) 149 368 52 465
Employment 5.660 4.723 *** 5.872 4.811 ***
ln(L) 696 3841 238 4299
Age 20.112 17.658 *** 19.046 17.978 –
696 3841 238 4299
B. Differences
Energy share in gross output −0.004 0.000 – 0.012 −0.001 –
ln(EE/GO) 696 3841 238 4299
Energy expenditure 0.030 0.025 – 0.037 0.025 –
Δln(EE) 696 3841 238 4299
Electricity 0.012 −0.008 – −0.003 −0.002 –
Δln(El) 149 368 52 465
Employment −0.017 −0.022 – −0.017 −0.021 –
Δln(L) 696 3841 238 4299
Notes: Summary statistics for the year 2000 (panel A) and the difference in growth rates between year 1999 and 2000 (panel B) by CCL and NEPER status. For each variable, we report the
mean and the number of observations in the rowbelow the variablemean.We report thenatural logarithm for all variables except age. Columns 3 and6 report signiﬁcance levels of a t-test
of differences in groupmeanswith unequal variance, at b1% (***), b5% (**), b10% (*). Among the 4537 ARD plants, 3743 are not eligible for the 3% reduced tax rate and pay the 15% carbon
tax, and 556 are not eligible for the 3% tax rate but nevertheless beneﬁt from the reduced rate.
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variable T, this variable is zero for all plants before 2001 and does not
vary between 2001 and 2004. To match EPER facilities to plants in our
dataset we use the same algorithm that we used for matching CCA par-
ticipation data.4.2. Descriptive statistics
Our regression sample comprises 6886 and 1079 plants in the ARD
and QFI datasets, respectively.27 Table G.1 in the online appendix re-
ports descriptive statistics. We calculate energy intensity as the share
of energy expenditures in either gross output or variable costs (the
sum of expenditures on materials, energy and wages), ﬁnding a sub-
stantial amount of dispersion between plants. For example, the energy
expenditure share in gross output of a plant at the 90th percentile is
seven times larger than that of a plant at the 10th percentile. We report
both quantities consumed and expenditures paid for the fuel variables,
after aggregating up some of the variables available in the QFI to obtain
the categories liquid fuels (oil, petrol, and LPG), solid fuels (coal and
coke) and natural gas (ﬁrm contract, interruptible contract, tariff).
Moreover, we compute the share of natural gas in the consumption of
both gas and electricity, and total CO2 emissions (in thousands of
tonnes) on the basis of the fuel mix.
The regression sample starts in 1999, because this is the ﬁrst year for
which energy expenditure data are available in the ARD, and covers the
ﬁrst two target periods that lasted from 2001 until 2004. This window
of analysis avoids possible complications due to (i) an overlap with the
EUETSwhich affected approximately 500CCAplants from2005onwards,
(ii) adjustments of CCA targets for the third compliance period, and
(iii) new entry of sectors in 2006 following changes in the eligibility rules.
Table 2 displays the means of the main variables in the pre-
treatment year 2000 (panel A) and the differences between year 2000
and 1999 (panel B), broken down by treatment and eligibility status.2827 To limit the effect of outliers we dropped 441 observations in the ARD and 119 observa-
tions in the QFI sample for which growth in the outcome variables were in the top and bot-
tom 1%. We omit SIC sector 23, “Production of Fuels (cookeries, reﬁneries)”, as it is exempt
from the CCL based on “The Climate Change Levy (Use as Fuel) Regulations 2001” No. 1138.
28 See Table G.3 in the online appendix for further outcome variables not reported here.The treatment variable CCL takes a value of one if a plant pays the full
tax rate and a value of zero if the plant participates in a CCA. Panel A
shows that participation in CCAs is not random: CCAplants are, on aver-
age, older, larger and more energy intensive. For most of these plant
characteristics, a t-test of equal groupmeans for CCL and CCA plants re-
jects at the 1% signiﬁcance level. Given this strong correlation between
treatment status and observable plant characteristics, we cannot rule
out that unobservable plant characteristics also inﬂuence selection.
We address selection in levels by differencing out ﬁxed unobserved
plant characteristics in Eq. (2). Tomitigate bias from selection on chang-
es in the outcome variables, we instrument the difference regression
using eligibility which is presumably exogenous to innovations in the
outcome variables. This assumption is more credible if we ﬁnd that eli-
gible and non-eligible plants do not follow systematically different
trends in terms of the outcome variables ahead of the treatment.We ex-
amine this in Fig. 1 by plotting average changes in the main outcome
variables with respect to the year 2000, both for eligible and non-
eligible plants, as well as by treatment status.29 This shows that trends
were closely aligned when treatment was imminent. More formally,
panel B of Table 2 reports the pre-treatment growth rates by treatment
and eligibility status, alongwith the results of a t-test for group equality.
The test never rejects at the 5% level, suggesting that differential pre-
trends in outcome variables were not important. This mitigates con-
cerns about changes in the outcome variables being confounded with
unobserved attributes of eligible ﬁrms. Finally, selection bias might
also arise if attrition rates are systematically related to treatment status.
We investigate this in Section 6.3 below, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant impact of
the CCL on plant exit relative to CCA plants.
5. Results
5.1. Determinants of CCL status
Table 3 reports the results from various regressions of CCL status on
NEPER and other plant characteristics. Each regression is run in both the
ARD and the QFI samples. Columns 1 and 4 report the marginal effects
from a probit regression of CCL on NEPER in the cross section for the29 See Fig. G.3 in the online appendix for the remaining outcome variables.
Table 3
Determinants of CCL status.
Dependent variable Probability that a plant is subject to a 15% carbon tax (CCL = 1)
Sample ARD sample QFI sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time period 2001 2000–2004 2001 2001 1998–2004 2001
Method Probit OLS Probit Probit OLS Probit
Not eligible for a 3% carbon tax (NEPER = 1) 0.284*** 0.392*** 0.440*** 0.345***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.090) (0.060)
ln(Gross output)t − 1 0.033*** 0.033
(0.012) 0.082
ln(Capital)t − 1 −0.038*** −0.231***
(0.010) 0.069
ln(Energy expenditure)t − 1 −0.043*** −0.105**
(0.007) 0.044
ln(Employment)t − 1 −0.023** 0.147**
(0.010) 0.044
Sector controls Yes Yes Yes Ye Yes Yes
R-squared 0.296 0.816 0.384 0.280 0.690 0.359
Observations 4027 16,876 3975 436 4619 424
Notes: Probit results report the marginal effect on the probability of being subject to the full-rate CCL. All regressions additionally include age, age squared, and region effects. Standard
errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (except probit models), and in addition pooled OLS's standard errors are clustered at the plant level. Asterisks
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
Table 4
Impact of the CCL on plant outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables OLS RF IV Obs./plants
A. ARD variables
Energy share in gross output −0.023* −0.058*** −0.181** 16,876
Δln(EE/GO) (0.013) (0.022) (0.071) 6886
Energy share in var. costs −0.026** −0.067*** −0.211*** 16,876
Δln(EE/VCost) (0.013) (0.022) (0.071) 6886
Energy expenditure −0.019 −0.030 −0.095 16,876
Δln(EE) (0.013) (0.019) (0.062) 6886
Gross output 0.004 0.027 0.086 16,876
Δln(GO) (0.011) (0.017) (0.054) 6886
Employment 0.010 0.026 0.082 16,876
Δln(L) (0.011) (0.017) (0.054) 6886
Total factor productivity 0.001 0.000 0.001 16,810
Δln(GO) ~ inputs (0.006) (0.011) (0.033) 6851
B. QFI variables
Electricity −0.033 −0.069** −0.226** 4587
Δln(El) (0.022) (0.031) (0.109) 1079
Natural gas −0.053 0.052 0.165 3748
Δln(Gas) (0.037) (0.044) (0.156) 908
Natural gas share −0.027** 0.021 0.071 4587
Δ(Gas/(Gas + El)) (0.012) (0.023) (0.079) 1079
Solid fuels 0.174* 0.101 0.460 1563
Δln(So) (0.096) (0.156) (0.654) 445
Solid fuels share −0.033 0.006 0.021 4587
Δ(So/kWh) (0.022) (0.008) (0.026) 1079
Total kWh −0.105*** −0.004 −0.015 4587
Δln(kWh) (0.027) (0.037) (0.118) 1079
CO2 −0.073*** −0.026 −0.084 4587
Δln(CO2) (0.022) (0.030) (0.095) 1079
Notes: The estimates come from 39 separate regressions. Columns 1 and 3 report the OLS
and IV estimates, respectively, of the coefﬁcient on the treatment variable in Eq. (2). Col-
umn 2 reports the OLS coefﬁcient on the instrumental variable in the reduced-form
Eq. (3). Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. Dependent variables
are ﬁrst-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter
(Δ). All regressions include age, age squared, as well as dummies for year, region and 3-
digit industry code. In panel A, the total factor productivity regressions also control for
labor, capital stock, and for expenditures on materials and energy. Robust standard errors
reported in parenthesis are clustered at the plant level. Asterisks indicate statistical signif-
icance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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plant's chances of paying the tax in full by 28.4% in the ARD sample and
by 44% in the QFI sample. The results from the ﬁrst-stage regression un-
derlying the IV estimation of Eq. (2) in ﬁrst differences are reported in
columns 2 and 5. They corroborate that there is a robust positive and
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the treatment variable
and the instrument. Columns 3 and 6 display the results from a probit
regression of CCL status in 2001 on various plant level controls evaluat-
ed at their 2000 levels. The coefﬁcient estimates show that the simple
correlations between CCL status and plant characteristics we found in
Table 2 persist after controlling for sectoral differences. In particular,
plants that were larger in terms of their capital and energy inputs
prior to treatment were more likely to participate in a CCA. The coefﬁ-
cients on energy and gross output suggest that the same is true of
more energy intensive plants. In Section B.2 of the online appendix we
present further evidence pointing to size and energy intensity as the
main determinants for take up among eligible plants. This is consistent
with the notion that the 80% discount on the energy tax rate would
allow only large and energy-intensive plants to accumulate enough
tax savings to cover the ﬁxed costs of CCA participation.
5.2. Treatment effect of the CCL
Table 4 summarizes the regression results for various outcome vari-
ables from the ARD (panel A) and the QFI (panel B). Columns 1 to 3 re-
port, respectively, the OLS estimate of the treatment coefﬁcient α in
Eq. (2), the OLS estimate of the coefﬁcient eα in the reduced-form
Eq. (3), and the average treatment effect on CCL plants obtained via IV
estimation of Eq. (2).
The ﬁrst two rows in panel A of Table 4 report the results for energy
intensity measured as the share of energy expenditures in either gross
output and variable costs, respectively. We ﬁnd that the CCL caused
plants to decrease their energy intensity relative to CCA plants. The
point estimates from the IV regressions are−0.181 for the formermea-
sure and−0.211 for the latter. The effects are both economically and
statistically signiﬁcant. The importance of controlling for selection is ev-
ident from the sizable differences between the OLS and IV estimates. In
particular, OLS estimation leads to an upward bias when estimating the
effect of the CCL on the growth in energy intensity. This is because the
OLS estimator does not correct for the self-selection of energy intensive
plants into the low-tax regime, whichwe found in Table 3 above. As we
show in Section 6.1 below, this type of plant respondedmore strongly to
the CCL, causing bias towards zero in the OLS estimates.In rows 3 and 4, we break down the effect on energy intensity by
looking at its components. The IV point estimates of−0.095 for energy
expenditure and 0.086 for gross output suggest that CCL plants both re-
duced energy and increased gross output so as to achieve the reductions
in energy intensity reported in row 1. However, the point estimates are
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ﬂects the fact that both variables lump together prices and quantities,
which are likely to move in opposing directions and thus attenuate
the effect of higher energy prices.30 Furthermore, we obtain a positive
but not statistically signiﬁcant point estimate for employment of 0.082.
We derive an estimate of the CCL impact on TFP from an augmented
Eq. (1) which includes the production factors capital, labor, materials,
and energy. This amounts to estimating a production function where
the treatment variable captures the impact of the CCL on otherwise un-
explained differences in TFP.31 The coefﬁcients reported in row 6 are
positive but small in magnitude and lack statistical signiﬁcance. We
thus cannot reject the hypothesis that the CCL had no effect on plant-
level TFP.
The evidence in panel A clearly shows that the CCL led to substantial
reductions in plant-level energy intensity compared to the CCA. While
the other coefﬁcients are estimated less precisely, the point estimates
are consistent with ﬁrms substituting labor for energy and increasing
output prices in response to the energy price increase. In Appendix E
we show that all the qualitative results in Panel A – including the stron-
ger response of energy intensity than energy expenditures – can be gen-
erated by a simple equilibrium model with neo-classical production
functions that exhibit a sufﬁciently large degree of substitutability be-
tween labor and energy.
The CCL packagewas not part of any harmonized carbon tax scheme
for Europe but a unilateral policy measure. As such, it may have had a
detrimental effect on the competitiveness of UK industry. On the basis
of the positive but insigniﬁcant point estimates we obtain for employ-
ment and gross output, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the CCL did not cause ﬁrms to shed jobs or lose revenue relative to
CCAﬁrms.While it seems plausible that the CCL lowered proﬁts we can-
not estimate this effect directly for lack of pertinent data. However, if
proﬁt losses were substantial they might have induced ﬁrms to shut
down some plants. We examine this possibility in Section 6.3 below.
From a climate-policy perspective, it is important to know whether
reductions in energy expenditures in CCL plants actually occurred,
whether they corresponded to reductions in energy consumption and
whether they lowered carbon emissions. For example, instead of con-
suming less of all fuel types CCL plants might substitute towards fuels
that are cheaper but alsomore polluting, such as coal. More detailed in-
formation on energy use is needed to address this issue, as the energy
expenditures variable lumps together changes in the tax-inclusive
price and quantity of energy, as well as the effects of substitution be-
tween different fuel types.
Panel B of Table 4 reports results from regressions using quantity
changes in energy consumption by fuel type which are available in the
QFI sample. Although this sample is smaller than the ARD sample, we
ﬁnd economically and statistically signiﬁcant evidence that the CCL
caused plants to decrease their electricity use by 22.6%. For natural gas,
solid fuels, and solid fuels as a share of total kWh consumed we obtain
positive point estimates of the treatment effect.32 However, the coefﬁ-
cients are not estimated with enough precision to support conclusions
about interfuel substitution.
The signiﬁcant decrease in electricity consumption among CCL
plants translates into a decrease in carbon dioxide emissions ceteris
paribus, but this could be offset by an increase in the consumption of
other fuel types. The last row of Table 4 shows the impact of the CCL
on total CO2 emissions, calculated as the sum of emissions across fuel30 As ﬁrms pay a higher after-tax price for energy but likely demand less of it, energy ex-
penditures can go up or down. Moreover, the effect on revenue is dampened because the
higher marginal cost tends to raise product prices while also reducing physical output.
31 This controls for production function endogeneity arising from ﬁxed unobserved het-
erogeneity across plants (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995).
32 We report natural gas use as a share of gas and electricity only, as other fuels are less
frequently used. The regressions on solid fuels are conditional on a plant using solid fuels
in at least one period. In contrast, the solid fuels share is computed for all plants and takes
the value of zero for plants that do not use it.types. The CCL is associated with a signiﬁcant decrease in total CO2
emissions of 7.3% in the OLS regression. The point estimate increases
slightly when going from OLS to IV, yet statistical signiﬁcance is lost.
We conjecture that this is due to the noisy estimates of the tax response
for fuels other than electricity. In the absence of a larger sample that
would enable us to estimate this effect with more precision, there are
two possible ways of quantifying the effect of the CCL on carbon emis-
sions. On the onehand, one can choose to disregard statistically insignif-
icant coefﬁcients altogether and conclude that the unchecked decrease
in electricity consumption translates into a decrease in CO2 emissions
of equal magnitude. On the other hand, a more cautious interpretation
of the results is to use the point estimate of−0.084 from the IV estima-
tion which accounts for the possibility that some CCL plants switched
into dirtier fuels such as coal. We thus conclude that the CCL – though
not designed as a pure carbon tax – caused plants paying the full rate
to reduce CO2 emissions by between 8.4% and 22.6% compared to plants
that paid the reduced rate.
In further regressions, reported in Section F of the online appendix,
we interact the treatment indicator with year dummies so as to recover
the time proﬁle of the treatment response following the introduction of
the CCL. This can reveal possible time delay in plants' responses to the
treatment, or whether the treatment effect dies off after a while. We
ﬁnd that the tax has the largest effect on the ARD outcome variables
in the ﬁrst two years of treatment. While the negative impact of the
CCL on electricity use is statistically signiﬁcant from 2002 onwards,
the point estimates for natural gas and coal are usually not statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level.33
5.3. Robustness checks
5.3.1. Balanced sample
Our sample is an unbalanced panel for a number of reasons: random
sampling of smaller plants in the ARD, plant births and deaths, andmiss-
ing responses from someplants in some years. As the set of plants in the
sample changes slightly from year to year, the time proﬁle of the treat-
ment effect might reﬂect – at least in part – the changes in sample com-
position rather than the dynamic response to the CCL. Another potential
problemwith the unbalanced panel is that the results could bedominat-
ed by potentially more extreme responses of exitors. To address these
concerns, we estimate the model with time interactions in a subset of
“stayer” plants with observations in all years after 1999. The results
are summarized in Tables G.4–G.6 in the online appendix. Since the
sample size drops by about half in both samples, some of the estimated
treatment effects lose statistical signiﬁcance. However, the qualitative
ﬁndings remain similar to the ones estimated on the full sample.
5.3.2. Controlling for pre-treatment trends
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the (untestable) assumption that
differences between eligible and non-eligible plants are not systemati-
cally related to changes in outcome variables over the treatment period.
In Section 4.2, we have shown that pre-treatment trends did not differ
across these groups in a statistically signiﬁcant way, meaning that
our estimates are unlikely to confound the impact of the treatment
with pre-existing differences. To corroborate this, we include a time-
invariant eligibility dummy in Eq. (2) so as to directly control for unob-
served trends in the outcomevariables, separately by eligibility status. 34
Tables G.7 and G.8 in the online appendix show that this yields qualita-
tively similar results, albeit less statistically signiﬁcant ones in later
years. Since the coefﬁcients on the eligibility dummy are statistically33 A positive and signiﬁcant point estimate is obtained for gas consumption in 2001.
However, this result proves not robust to controlling for endogenous attrition of gas con-
suming plants in the logarithmic speciﬁcation, which could generate this result in a spuri-
ous manner. See Appendix F for details.
34 Like sector and region dummies, this dummy is interactedwith year differences to ac-
count for time intervals of varying length in the sample. See Appendix C for details.
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clude them in our preferred speciﬁcation.
5.3.3. Common support regression
Despite our IV strategy there might be concern that results are driv-
en by a fundamental heterogeneity between treated (eligible) and non-
treated (non-eligible) plants. Therefore, as a robustness test we restrict
the control group to a common support which is identiﬁed by the pre-
dicted probability of a plant in the control group to receive treatment.35
We construct this common support sample by dropping plants that do
not belong to the central 80% of the propensity score distribution,
while also balancing the covariates between the treatment and the con-
trol group.36 The results obtained for the common support sample are
reported in Table G.9 of the online appendix. For the ARD variables in
panel A this leads to slightly larger point estimates, suggesting that het-
erogeneity within the treated group is not a major problem. In the
smaller QFI dataset, about half of the sample needs to be dropped, but
this entails no qualitative change to the results.
6. Heterogeneous impacts, aggregate effects, and plant exit
6.1. The impact of the CCL in different subsamples
Our discussion so far has focused on the average effect of the CCL on
non-treated plants. It is useful to know how this effect varies across
plants with certain characteristics. For example, the tax impact may dif-
fer from the ATNT in industries that are very energy intensive because
the levy imposes a higher cost burden on these industries. Moreover,
as the political cost of job losses is high, policy-makersmight be interest-
ed in the tax impact on small ﬁrms which are responsible for the bulk of
total employment. Finally, the impact of the CCL on competitivenessmay
be particularly high for ﬁrms in sectors with high import penetration, as
foreign competition prevents them from passing compliance cost on to
their customers through higher output prices.
To shed light on this, we estimate the impact of the CCL separately:
(i) for plants with more vs. less than 250 employees, (ii) for plants
with high vs. low energy intensity and (iii) for plants with high vs.
low trade intensity.37 The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 report the IV co-
efﬁcients for the split by energy intensity, deﬁned as the share of energy
expenditures in gross output. Results for the low- and high-intensity
groups are reported in the odd and even-numbered columns, respec-
tively. The IV point estimates for energy intensity and energy expendi-
tures indicate that the average effects reported in Table 4 are due to a
strong response by plants in energy intensive sectors. The point esti-
mates in this group are−0.195 for energy intensity and−0.154 for en-
ergy expenditures, both are statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. In contrast, the
point estimates for the low-intensity group lack statistical signiﬁcance.
The point estimates for electricity consumption are similar in magni-
tude across groups but lack statistical signiﬁcance in the low-intensity
group.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 we split the sample according to the
trade intensity in 4-digit NACE sectors, which is computed as the35 See Blundell et al. (2004) for a framework that combines propensity score matching
with a differences-in-differences estimator.
36 Propensity scores are computed as the predicted values of a probit regression of CCL
status on plant characteristics for the year 2000. We restrict the sample to the common
support and verify that covariates in the resulting sample are balanced. Gross output, cap-
ital, materials, employment, the squares of these variables, aswell as energy expenditures,
are all balanced at the 1% conﬁdence level.
37 The splitting points for energy and trade intensities are deﬁned at the 3-digit and 4-
digit sector level, respectively, based on pre-treatment averages across plants in the sector.
After sorting sectors in the order of decreasing intensity, we assign sectors to the high in-
tensity group until approximately 50% of plants are assigned to this group. The remaining
sectors are assigned to the low intensity group.value of imports and exports to non-EU countries over the total market
size within the EU27.38 This measure has been used by the EU Commis-
sion to gauge the competitiveness impact of the EU ETS onmanufactur-
ing ﬁrms. To the extent that trade intensity measures the degree of
competition from non-regulated countries, it picks up the (lack of) abil-
ity of ﬁrms to pass on the cost of the CCL to their customers. The point
estimates for the ARD variables obtained in the trade intensive group
closely follow those obtained in the full ARD sample. In contrast, the im-
pact on energy intensity is not statistically signiﬁcant in the low-
intensity group. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact on employment
in either of the two groups. This gives rise to two interpretations: ﬁrst,
that trade intensitymight not be a good criterion for identifying adverse
effects on competitiveness; or second, that the hypothesis which states
that there are no such effects should not be rejected.
The last two columns of Table 5 report the results for the employ-
ment split. While the point estimates for energy expenditures in small
plants and electricity use in large plants are negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level, no clear pattern emerges from this compar-
ison across size groups.
6.2. Aggregate effects of a carbon tax
While the micro-level approach allows for better identiﬁcation of
the causal impacts of the tax, from a policy point-of-view the aggregate
implications of the taxmatter. In this section,we compute the effect of a
counterfactual carbon tax similar to the CCL butwithout the reduced tax
rate. This exercise allows us to compare our results to studies assessing
the impact of energy price changes on fuel consumption at the aggre-
gate level.
Taking into account heterogeneous treatment effects at the plant










where the plant speciﬁc treatment effect αi is weighted by the share of
plant i in the aggregate Y. To be able to compute ΛY, we assume a ho-
mogenous treatment effect equal to the IV estimate among all tax con-
cerned plants i, αi ¼ α^ATNT . For tax unconcerned plants, we assume that
treatment effects are zero because plants that do not apply for a tax dis-
count are less likely to change their energy consumption in response to
the tax itself. Finally, while all CCA plants are tax concerned by deﬁni-
tion, there may be tax concerned plants in the non-eligible group. We
predict the probability pi that plant i is of the tax concerned type,
using the probit models reported in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3. In com-
puting the aggregate impact Λ^Y, weweight each plant's impact by p
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According to this back-of-the-envelope calculation, had the CCL been
applied to all plants without rebates, it would have decreased aggregate
energy expenditures in manufacturing by at least 5.6% and aggregate
electricity consumption by at least 13.4%.39
What do these estimates imply for the price elasticity of aggregate en-
ergy demand? Given that, on average, CCL plants pay 1:151:03−1 ¼ 11:7%
more for energy than CCA plants, the implicit price elasticity of energy38 Data on trade intensity were taken from the Impact Assessment accompanying the
“Commission Decision determining a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to
be exposed to a signiﬁcant risk of carbon leakage pursuant to Article 10a (13) of Directive
2003/87/EC”, of September 4, 2009. NACE is the statistical classiﬁcation systemof econom-
ic activities in the European Union.
39 Respectively,ΛEE= [exp(−0.095)−1]×0.62=−5.62%andΛ^El ¼ exp −0:226ð Þ−1
 
0:66 ¼−13:35%.
42 Loss of international competitiveness and carbon leakage have been used with some
success by industry to lobby against carbon taxes or carbon pricing more generally (see
Martin et al., forthcoming), for the case of permit auctions in the EU ETS. Virtually all
European governments that levy taxes on energy use or carbon emissions (i.e. Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) have also granted exemptions or
partial tax rebates to industries carrying a high tax burden.
43 Ifwe assigned all plants that exit prior to treatment to the control group, the estimated
Table 5
CCL impact in different sub-samples (IV coefﬁcients).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Energy intensity Trade intensity Size
Dependent variables Low High Low High Low High
Energy share in gross output −0.159 −0.195** −0.115 −0.196* −0.225 −0.141
Δln(EE/GO) (0.159) (0.081) (0.098) (0.100) (0.190) (0.087)
Energy expenditure 0.071 −0.154** −0.081 −0.089 −0.292* 0.030
Δln(EE) (0.131) (0.072) (0.088) (0.084) (0.172) (0.077)
Employment 0.216 0.047 0.102 0.063 −0.082 0.119
Δln(L) (0.146) (0.054) (0.090) (0.068) (0.108) (0.089)
Electricity −0.247 −0.233* −0.321 −0.107 −0.059 −0.286*
Δln(El) (0.235) (0.138) (0.252) (0.110) (0.175) (0.161)
ARD sample Obs. 8040 8836 8096 7871 10,145 6702
Plants 3276 3610 3201 3213 4905 1971
QFI sample Obs 2001 2586 1994 2318 2122 2274
Plants 470 609 461 552 513 450
Notes: The table reports the estimated treatment effect on various plant-level outcomes and in different sub-samples, obtained from24 separate IV regressions of Eq. (2). Energy and trade
intensity samples are split according to themedian deﬁned at the 3-digit and 4-digit sector level, respectively, in 1999 or 2000. Size is deﬁned based on employment at the respondent unit,
those with 250 employees or less in 2000 or 1999 qualiﬁed as small. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the plant levels. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁ-
cance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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  ¼ 0:44. Under the as-
sumption that the incidence of the CCL is on the buyers of energy, this
implies an upper bound on the price elasticity of energy demand equal
to ηE = | − 0.44 − 1| = 1.44.40 The elasticity of electricity demand
can be computed in a similar fashion. Given that the CCL raised the elec-
tricity price by 0:434:25 ¼ 10:1% for the average manufacturing plant (cf.
Table 1), the tax differential between CCL plants and non-CCL plants is
approximately 0:80:434:25þ0:20:43 ¼ 7:9%. Hence the elasticity of electricity de-
mand is given by −0:1190:079
  ¼ 1:51, which is slightly larger than the elastic-
ity recovered in the ARD sample.
Both numbers are at the upper endof elasticity estimates obtained in
comparable studies. For example, Bjorner and Jensen (2002) estimate
the energy price elasticity at 1.37 in the pooled cross-section and 0.50
in a ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation.41 The reader should bear in mind, how-
ever, that we recover an estimate of a tax-induced price elasticity.
Davis and Kilian (2011) argue that this is structurally different from
elasticity estimates based on other kinds of price variation because
taxes may be perceived as more persistent and hence induce larger be-
havioral changes. They also point to a possible additional effect ofmedia
coverage that accompanies the introduction of such taxes. Since the CCL
was promoted as the UK's ﬂagship regulation for mitigating climate
change, there was ample scope for such an effect of the CCL, and our
comparatively large estimates do not speak against this possibility.
Finally, notice that the IV point estimates are too large if we are
underestimating the share of compliers Pr(CCL = 0|NEPER = 0). This
possibility could arise because we were not able to match all CCA facili-
ties when information on the business address or name was missing or
wrong. In this case, the intent-to-treat (ITT) parameter, or reduced-
form coefﬁcient, reported in column 5 of Table 4, can provide a lower
bound because it does not depend on the quality of the CCA match.
The ITT point estimates for energy expenditures and electricity are
−0.030 and −0.069, respectively. This translates into elasticity esti-
mates of exp −0:030ð Þ−10:117 −1
  ¼ 1:25 for energy demand and exp −0:069ð Þ−10:079
 40 This assumption seems plausible given that fuel suppliers can easily switch between
CCL and CCA ﬁrms. To test this, we employ the IV regression framework to estimate the
causal impact of the introduction of the CCL on fuel prices exclusive of the tax. The results,
reported in Table G.10 of the online appendix, suggest that producer prices of electricity
and natural gas did not respond to the introduction of the CCL. The point estimates for less
commonly used solid and liquid fuels are negative and larger inmagnitude. This could in-
dicate that suppliers of these fuels assumed part of the tax incidence, but the estimates are
not very precise.
41 Our OLS estimate in the difference equation implies an upper bound on the elasticity
of 1.09 but – as we have argued above – this is biased towards zero if contracting ﬁrms se-
lect into CCAs.¼ 0:84 for electricity demand which are both somewhat lower than
the bounds derived using the simple approximation to the aggregate im-
pact of the CCL.
6.3. The CCL and plant exit
The analysis so far has focused on how paying the full rate of the CCL
affects various outcome variables in surviving plants. Rather than
adjusting energy use and production at the intensive margin, there is
a concern that ﬁrms might respond to the CCL by closing down plants
altogether or by re-locating to non-regulated countries (“pollution ha-
vens”). After all, the substantial tax rebates granted under the CCA are
intended to prevent such extensive-margin adjustments by energy in-
tensive ﬁrms.42
We examine this by constructing a dummy variable EXIT which
equals 1 in the year of exit (deﬁned as the year following the last report-
ed year) and 0 otherwise. To avoid recording data set attrition as plant
exit, we construct EXIT based on the Interdepartmental Business Regis-
ter (IDBR), which contains the universe of business establishments in
the UK and serves as the sampling frame for the ARD and QFI data
sets. If exit occurs in year t, the plant is removed from the sample in sub-
sequent years. Note that we cannot estimate the effect of the CCL on
plant exit decisions by substituting EXITit for the outcome variable in
Eq. (2) because we do not know whether plants that exited in pre-
treatment periods would have received treatment or not.43 Instead,
we propose an IV estimator that exploits variation in pre-sample em-
ployment size. We deﬁne a dummy SMALLi which indicates thattreatment effect would be biased. To see this, recall that the differences-in-differences es-
timator of an exogenous treatment T is identiﬁed from the sample equivalent of the
expression
α ¼ E½Yit Ti ¼ 1; Tit ¼ 1j −E½Yit Ti ¼ 1; Tit ¼ 0j 
−E Yit Ti ¼ 0; Tit ¼ 1j  þ E Yit Ti ¼ 0; Tit ¼ 0j ½½
where Tit indicates the treatment period and Ti = 1 indicates that a plant belongs to the
treatment group. In the case of exit, by construction we have no exit in the treatment
group, i.e. E[EXITit|Ti=1, Tit=0]= 0. As a consequence, even in the case of an exogenous
exit probability ρ N 0which is constant across plants and time periods (i.e. α=0), this es-
timator is upwardly biased, since a^ ¼ ρ−0− ρ−ρð Þ ¼ ρN0. This problem is aggravated in
the IV estimator as we would falsely assign NEPER= 1 to some exiting plants that would
have been listed in EPER had they survived until 2001.
Table 6
Exit regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit RF FS IV
Plants subject to a 15% carbon tax 0.059*** 0.000 0.018*** −0.007
(CCL = 1) or SMALL × I{t N 2000} (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.084)
SMALL 0.036*** 0.037*** −0.001*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 679,240 679,240 679,240 679,240
Notes: The table reports the results of probit (column 1) and IV probit (column 4) regres-
sions of exit at the local unit level, along with reduced-form and ﬁrst-stage regressions
(columns 2 and 3, respectively). SMALL is a dummy indicating that employment at the
plant was below the median in 1997. Coefﬁcients in columns 1 and 4 are reported in
terms ofmarginal effects w.r.t. the probability of exit, evaluated at themean of the explan-
atory variables. The sample period ranges from 1998 to 2004. All regressions include year
dummies, age and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the local unit level. Aster-
isks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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from 1998 onwards, we estimate the probit regression
Pr EXITit ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ Φ αCCLit þ SMALLi1997 þ x0itβ
 
: ð6Þ
This allows for ﬁxed differences in the exit propensity between small
and large plants and, since employment size and treatment status are
strongly correlated (see Table 2), SMALLmay also, to a large extent, con-
trol for ﬁxed heterogeneity between treatment and control groups.
Moreover, we use the interaction of SMALLi with a post-treatment
dummy I{t N2000} to instrument for CCLit. The idea behind this is (i) to
use the fact that size inﬂuenced the decision to participate in a CCA
and (ii) to rely on variation in size prior to our sample period so as to
preserve the exogeneity of the instrument. The estimated coefﬁcient α
has the interpretation of a local average treatment effect (LATE).
Since all the information needed to estimate Eq. (6) is available from
the IDBR, we implement these regressions at the local unit level (see
footnote 23 above). Table 6 reports the results from probit and IV probit
models, along with the corresponding reduced-form (RF) and ﬁrst-
stage (FS) results. In each of the exit regressions, the coefﬁcient on
SMALL is positive and signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the already well-
documented empirical regularity that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to
exit. The simple probitmodel yields a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
estimate on CCLwhich implies a 5.9% increase of the exit probability at
the average CCL plant. Notice that this effect is not necessarily causal. In
fact, the positive coefﬁcient is consistent with a reverse-causality expla-
nation according to which, plants that anticipate to exit in the near fu-
ture do not sign a CCA because the tax savings this generates over the
remaining lifetime of the plant do not cover the ﬁxed costs of certiﬁca-
tion to be paid upfront. Once we instrument for CCL status, the point es-
timate becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, as foreshadowed by the
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate on the instrument obtained in the re-
duced form. The ﬁrst-stage regression coefﬁcients show that our instru-
ment is strongly correlatedwith CCL status. In sum,we ﬁnd no evidence
that the CCL had an impact on plant exit decisions. This ﬁnding is robust
to the inclusion of industry controls and to splitting the sample by either
energy or trade intensity as in Section 6.1 above.44
Our analysis has focused on exit decisions at the local unit level
whereas the bulk of the variables used in Section 5 are only available
at a slightly higher level of aggregation (the ‘reporting unit’ or ‘plant’).
Since employment (and only employment) is available at both levels
of aggregation, we re-estimate a version of Eq. (2) using employment
data at the local unit level in order to verify that the results obtained
at the reporting unit level are robust. Table 7 reports estimates of the
CCL impact on employment in the full sample and when the sample is
split according to energy and trade intensities, or size (deﬁned as
above at the reporting unit level). Our preferred speciﬁcation includes
a trend coefﬁcient for the treatment group (NEPER × year diff) because
we ﬁnd it to be statistically signiﬁcant for the high trade intensity
group.45 As before, we do not ﬁnd evidence of a detrimental effect of
the CCL on employment, regardless of which way the data are cut.
7. Conclusion
There is a growing consensus that climate policy should aim to reg-
ulate GHG emissions efﬁciently across a broad range of economic sec-
tors. While curbing industrial emissions must be an integral part of
any such policy, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the44 Table G.11 in the online appendix reports reduced-form and ﬁrst-stage results for the
robustness checks. The coefﬁcient estimates for the full sample with 2-digit sector
dummies – reported in columns 1 and 2 – are virtually identical to the ones in Table 6.
When the sample is split by energy or trade intensity – columns 2 through 5 – the coefﬁ-
cient estimates for the reduced form remain unchanged and the ﬁrst-stage estimates
change only in insigniﬁcant ways.
45 If we had a panel of year-to-year changes only (i.e. year diff = 1), the trend would be
the coefﬁcient on a time-invariant NEPER dummy. See Appendix C for details.impacts of large-scale regulations of industrial GHG emissions —
let aloneusingmarket-based instruments. In this paperwehave provid-
ed the ﬁrst micro-econometric evaluation of a carbon tax on the
manufacturing sector. Unlike simulation-based evaluations, our ap-
proach does not require making assumptions about counterfactual –
“baseline” – trends in the outcome variable of interest. Instead, we com-
pare changes in outcomes both over time and between plants that were
subject to different tax rates. The “baseline” is hence given by the con-
temporaneous outcomes of plants that faced lower tax rates by virtue
of being in a CCA. Our estimates of the impact of the CCL are thus purged
of confounding factors that affect plant performance at the level of the
economy, the region and the sector. Since we also control for self-
selection into CCAs by exploiting exogenous variation in CCA eligibility
rules, we interpret our estimates as the causal effect of the CCL on
plant outcomes.
Weﬁnd robust evidence that the price incentive provided by the CCL
led to larger reductions in energy intensity and electricity use than the
energy efﬁciency or consumption targets agreed under the CCA. The
tax discount granted to CCA plants has been justiﬁed as a means of
preventing energy intensive ﬁrms from losing competitiveness in inter-
national product markets due to the unilateral implementation of the
tax and to the lack of international harmonization. Although this has
been widely argued, we ﬁnd no discernible impact on employment,
gross output or productivity across groups, andwe cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the CCL had no impact on plant exit.
Our results show that the introduction of a moderate tax on energy
encourages electricity conservation and helps to reduce energy intensi-
ty in the manufacturing sector. This is in contrast to previous research
that attributed substantial carbon savings to the CCA scheme on the
basis of comparisons with counterfactual baseline emissions (Ekins
and Etheridge, 2006; Barker et al., 2007; AEAT, 2004).46 While our re-
search design arguably produces a more credible estimate of the effect
of the CCL, it is clear that this effect is additional to any effect the CCA
targets may have had on ﬁrm behavior.
Our study constitutes a ﬁrst step towards building an evidence base
that informs policymakers about the impacts of climate change policies
on industry. As more such policies are being implemented across coun-
tries, and as business microdata are becoming more abundant and eas-
ier to access, we expect that researchers will exploit the variation in
policies and institutional settings to make important contributions to
this evidence base. In the context of climate change policy in the UK,
there are several issues that deserve attention in future research. First,46 This ﬁnding contrasts aswell with results obtained by Bjorner and Jensen (2002)who
investigate the consequences of a similar policy package in Denmark and obtain a positive
effect of negotiated agreements on energy efﬁciency. Apart from institutional differences
between the British and theDanish policy packages, the discrepancymight be owed to dif-
ferences in the research design as these authors do not control for selection into negotiat-
ed agreements based on time-varying unobservables.
Table 7
CCL impact on employment at local units.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Energy intensity Trade intensity Size
Low High Low High Small Large
Plants subject to a 15% carbon tax (CCL = 1) −0.011 −0.027 0.013 −0.008 0.012 −0.120 0.056
(0.045) (0.117) (0.042) (0.064) (0.074) (0.074) (0.057)
Trend of plants not eligible for a 3% carbon tax (NEPER × year diff) 0.003 0.006 0.001 −0.004 0.016** 0.000 −0.014
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 972,213 467,629 480,847 444,149 410,646 917,447 29,759
Plants 207,971 102,970 100,207 92,157 90,671 186,281 6682
Notes: Columns display IV estimates of the impact of the CCL on log employment at the local unit level for different samples. The dependent variable is ﬁrst-differenced from 1996 until
2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter. NEPER is a dummy variable that equals one if a facility is not on the EPER list. Energy and trade intensity samples are split according to
the median deﬁned at the 3-digit and 4-digit sector level, respectively, in 1999 or 2000. Size is deﬁned based on employment at the respondent unit, those with 250 employees or less in
2000 or 1999qualiﬁed as small. All regressions include age, age squared, year dummies, a full set of region-by-year and 3-digit sector-by-year dummies. Robust standard errors reported in
parenthesis are clustered at the plant level. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
13R. Martin et al. / Journal of Public Economics 117 (2014) 1–14it seems important to gain a better understanding of how plants
achieved the substantial reductions in energy use that we measure.
This will require gathering more qualitative information on the key
drivers of energy conservation — be they technical, economic or mana-
gerial. This information could lead to the design of more sophisticated
policy instruments. From a political economy point-of-view, an analysis
of the bargaining over CCA targets and of compliance behavior of indi-
vidual CCA facilities will provide valuable insights regarding the design
of negotiated agreements. Finally, given the long-term nature of climate
change, an important open question is whether a moderate energy tax
such as the CCL can stimulate much-needed innovation to bring about
substantial carbon reductions in the future.Acknowledgements
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